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Abstract 
 
The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on ‘the 
effect of foreign aid on corruption’ in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling 
corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by 
assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 
1996-2010. Two main findings are established to unite the two streams of the debate. (1) 
Foreign aid channeled through government’s consumption expenditure increases corruption. 
(2) Development assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort decreases 
corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is targeted towards reducing corruption should be 
channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure. Our 
results integrate an indirect component and reconcile the debate by showing that, the effect 
could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel.  
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1. Introduction  
 The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012, 2013a) on ‘the effect of 
foreign aid on corruption’ has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. In 
its current state, the debate lacks a unifying framework. Accordingly, both proponents in the 
debate have the drawback of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. 
Consistent with Knack & Keefer (1995)
1
, we argue that investigating institutional quality as a 
direct consequence of aid may be misleading in terms of policy implications because it fails to 
account for mechanisms through which development assistance is channeled. In uniting the 
two streams, we argue that investment and fiscal behavior channels are crucial in better 
understanding the relationship between development assistance and corruption. From an 
investment perspective, consistent with Easterly (2005), ‘Big Push’ (Harrod-Domar and 
Solow growth) models which constitute the main theoretical underpinnings in the aid 
literature are based on the need for substantial aid-financed improvements in investment in 
order to bridge ‘poverty and development’ gaps. From the fiscal behavior dimension, it is 
common sense to acknowledge that development assistance affects fiscal behavior in terms of 
government expenditure and tax effort.  
 The debate can be highlighted in three main strands. In the first, Okada and Samreth 
(O & S) have investigated the relationship in 120 developing countries for the period 1995-
2009 and concluded that aid generally reduces corruption and its reduction effect is greater in 
less corrupt countries. As a direct response, Asongu (2012) has partially negated their 
criticism of the mainstream approach to the aid-development nexus. Using data from 52 
African countries for the period 1996-2010, he has established that development assistance 
fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption) in the African continent. Hence, has 
concluded that the O & S findings for developing countries may not be relevant for Africa.  
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 Knack & Keefer (1995, p. 223) have concluded that more indicators are needed to properly account for the 
quality of institutions.  
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 The second strand is initiated by some scholars who have informally criticized Asongu 
(2012) for not taking into account the conditional dimension of the O & S conclusion 
(“…reduces corruption especially and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries” 
p.1). In response Asongu (2013a) has extended the debate by: not partially negating the 
methodological underpinnings of O & S and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from 
corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, democracy, 
government effectiveness, corruption, voice & accountability, political stability and 
corruption-control). Core to this response is a hypothetical contingency of the ‘institutional 
downside of foreign aid’ on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional perils of 
foreign aid maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken 
place. With the hypothesis of institutional thresholds of foreign aid effectiveness fully 
integrated into the debate, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional 
quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 (Asongu, 
2013a, p. 1).  
 In the third strand, some scholars have informally pointed-out the lack of fiscal policy 
and investment channels in the debate. Accordingly, the debate in its present state has not 
deviated from the Fielding et al. (2006) stance on a straight forward nexus between aid and 
development. Hence, consistent with Knack & Keefer (1995) who have concluded that more 
indicators are needed to properly account for the quality of institutions, we further extend the 
debate by providing an indirect dimension to the relationship with the help of transmission 
mechanisms. 
 The fiscal behavior and investment channels in the aid-corruption relationship are 
consistent with the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the aid literature (Rostow, 
1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Reichel, 1995; Boone, 1996; Gomanee et 
al., 2003; Mosley et al., 2004; Easterly, 2005; Addison et al., 2005; Morrissey, 2012). From a 
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theoretical standpoint, as highlighted above, the ‘Big-Push’ model on which foreign aid is 
based suggests that Africa is poor because it is stuck in poverty and institutional traps 
(Easterly, 2005). To emerge from these traps, it needs a substantial aid-financed increase in 
investment: a ‘Big Push’. Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth models have been 
used to substantiate these channels. The underlying assumption in this theoretical 
underpinning is the notion that the ‘Big Push’ is destined to bridge the saving-investment gap 
poor countries face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005). On the empirical 
front, in examining the effect of development assistance, a substantial bulk of studies has 
focused on the impact of aid-flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables 
(investment or public consumption). For instance, Gomanee et al. (2003) have concluded that 
development assistance has both a direct effect on welfare and an indirect impact via social 
services and public spending. The indirect dimension has been supported by Mosley et al. 
(2004) on poverty and wellbeing in recipient countries. Development assistance has also been 
found to encourage unproductive public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without increasing 
investment. This latter point has been confirmed by Reichel (1995) and Boone (1996). 
Addison et al. (2005) have also found aid to strengthen pro-poor public expenditure. 
Accordingly, donors are concerned about how their development assistance is used, especially 
the manner in which it affects the fiscal behavior of recipient countries because aid and fiscal 
behavior are linked via government spending and tax effort (Morrissey, 2012).  
 In light of the above channels of foreign aid, two mechanisms clearly standout from 
the theoretical and empirical underpinnings: investment and fiscal behavior channels. 
Therefore, the goal of this note is to extend the debate on the ‘effect of foreign aid on 
corruption’ with the mechanisms. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the data and outlines the methodology.  Section 3 covers the empirical analysis and 
corresponding discussion. We conclude with Section 4.  
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2. Data and Methodology  
2.1 Data  
We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data from the African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1996-2010. Limitations to African 
countries and periodicity are consistent with the underpinnings of the debate
2
.  The dependent 
variable is the corruption perception index (CPI), consistent with the debate (Asongu, 2012, 
2013a; Okada & Samreth, 2012).   
 The theoretical and empirical underpinnings for the endogenous explaining variables 
(channels) have already been substantially covered in the fifth paragraph of the introduction. 
Hence, we use private investment and fiscal behavior channels (government’s final 
consumption expenditure and tax revenues) in line with the literature (Rostow, 1960; Chenery 
& Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Boone, 1996; Addison et al., 2005; Reichel, 1995; 
Easterly, 2005;  Morrissey, 2012). The instrumental variables include: Total Net Official 
Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from Multilateral Donors (MD), NODA from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries and Grants excluding technical 
cooperation.  
Due to identification constraints, we are unable control for many macroeconomic and 
structural characteristics. In essence, owing to the limited number of instrumental variables, 
there are substantial constraints in the degrees of freedom needed for the Sargan 
overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity
3
. To avoid misspecification in 
the transmission mechanisms, we control only for inflation and economic prosperity. These 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that this time span is consistent with those employed by Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu 
(2012) and Asongu (2013a). The first have use data on 120 developing countries for the period 1995-2009, the 
second has used data on 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010 whereas the third has used data for the 
period 1996-2010 from 53 African countries.  
 
3
 An OIR test is only applicable in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments must be higher 
than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact-identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identification (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition is not possible. 
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two control variables are incorporated to reduce the degree of identification when 
development assistance instruments are invalid. From intuition, development assistance 
indirectly fuels demand-pull inflation but directly increases GDP.   
Details about the summary statistics, correlation analysis (showing the basic 
correlations between key variables employed in the note), variable definitions (with 
corresponding data sources) are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
respectively.  The ‘descriptive statistics’ of the variables shows  that, there is quite a degree of 
variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated 
relationships would emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate issues of 
overparametization and multicolinearity.  From an initial assessment of the correlation 
coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious issues in terms of the relationships to be 
estimated.  
 
2.2 Methodology  
The adoption of a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation technique has a twofold justification: while addressing the issue of endogeneity, 
the IV estimation underpinnings are in accordance with the problem statement of the note. 
Our concern for endogeneity is valid for two main reasons. Firstly, the CPI is a perception 
based measure that could be subject to public opinion bias (due to media propaganda for 
example), therefore concerns of measurement error and omitted variables. Secondly, whereas 
fiscal behavior and investment affect corrupt practices, corruption also affects private 
investment and government fiscal policies (as the current situation in Greece), hence the issue 
of reverse causality.  
The estimation procedure involves the following steps.  
First-stage regression:  
 itit sInstrumentInvestmentFB )(/ 10  it                                                 (1)                                                                                                    
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Second-stage regression: 
ititit InvestmentFBCorruption )()( 210   itj X   it                   (2)                                                                                        
In Eq. (2), X is a vector of control variables which include: GDP growth and inflation. 
FB stands for Fiscal behavior which encompasses Government’s final consumption 
expenditure, Tax revenues and Tax revenues on international trade. Investment entails Private 
investment. Instrumental variables include: Total NODA, NODA from DAC countries, NODA 
from MD and Grants. For Eq. (1)  and Eq. (2),  v  and u, respectively represent the error terms.  
Three main steps make-up the estimation process. Firstly, we justify the choice of the 
2SLS IV estimation strategy with a Hausman test for endogeneity. Secondly, we verify that 
the foreign aid instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining 
variables (fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms). Thirdly, we ensure the instruments 
are valid and not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest (Eq. (2)) with an 
OIR test. Further robustness checks will be ensured with: (1) estimation with robust 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and; (2) restricted 
and unrestricted modeling.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Presentation of results  
This section examines two main concerns: (1) the capacity of the exogenous 
components of investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms to explain corruption and; (2) the 
ability of the foreign aid instruments to explain corruption through the proposed channels
4
. 
Whereas the first concern is tackled by the significance and signs of estimated coefficients, 
                                                 
4
 The direct effects of foreign aid on corruption have already been demonstrated in the literature (Asongu, 2012, 
Asongu, 2013a). There is no need to do this any longer because Asongu (2012) has used an IV estimation 
technique to show the perilous character of foreign aid on corruption in 52 African countries for the same period 
(1996-2010). Accordingly, the scope of the debate is already firmly settled and the present positioning only 
extends the existing debate by means of indirect effects and fiscal policy behavior mechanisms. We are using the 
same database, the same set of countries and the same periodicity as in the studies motivating this extension. 
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the second issue is addressed with the Sargan OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the 
stance that the aid instruments explain corruption only via the proposed channels. Therefore, a 
rejection of the null, is a rejection of the view that the instruments do not explain corruption 
beyond the mechanisms. A Hausman test precedes the 2SLS-IV estimations. The null 
hypothesis of this test is the view that estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and 
consistent. Therefore, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity 
due to inconsistent estimates, hence, justifies the choice of the IV estimation strategy. Owing 
to the problem statement of this note, the Hausman is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the IV approach. Therefore, the 2SLS is still employed even in the absence of 
endogeneity. 
Table 1 below presents the results. Panel A (B) shows unrestricted (restricted) 
modeling. Restricted equations denote modeling in the absence of a constant term. While the 
first halves of both panels are estimations without HAC standard errors, the second halves 
consist of HAC standard errors estimations. From the results, the overwhelming rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the Hausman test provides justification for the choice of the 2SLS IV 
estimation technique. As concerns the first issue, the following conclusions could be drawn. 
(1) Government’s final consumption expenditure increases corruption. (2) Private investment 
and tax effort broadly decrease corruption. Note should be taken of the fact that, the CPI 
(dependent variable) is measured in decreasing order with high values denoting less 
corruption. For the second issue, the overwhelming failure to reject the null hypothesis of the 
Sargan OIR test shows that the foreign aid instruments explain corruption only through the 
proposed channels (conditional on the control variables). In other words, two conclusions can 
be established for the second issue. (1) Foreign aid channeled through government’s 
consumption expenditure increases corruption. (2) Development assistance channeled via 
private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is 
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targeted towards reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax 
effort, not through government expenditure.  
 One of the significant control variables has the expected sign: economic prosperity in 
African countries has been found to increase corruption irrespective of initial corruption-
control levels (Asongu, 2013b, pp. 43-44). The fact that inflation reduces corruption (in Panel 
B) is contrary to intuition. This is because we intuitively expected inflation to broadly 
encourage public officials to seek more rents in a bid to cope with rising prices. However, it is 
also interesting to note that, foreign aid could increase demand pull inflation that eventually 
decreases corrupt practices because of a general increase in the revenues of public officials 
who may no longer see rent seeking as the sole means of making ends meet. The 
interpretation is contingent on the hypothesis that the public officials formerly seeking rents 
expect aid flows to continue in the future.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Channels of foreign aid to corruption (Dependent variable: CPI) 
           
 Panel A: Unrestricted modeling 
 Without  HAC Standard Errors With  HAC Standard Errors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1* Model 2* Model 3* Model 4* Model 5* 
Constant 0.835 1.817* -0.090 2.267 3.191 0.835 1.817*** -0.090 2.267** 3.191 
 (0.213) (0.052) (0.939) (0.125) (0.165) (0.133) (0.001) (0.950) (0.029) (0.187) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.068** -0.07*** -0.070* -0.073** -0.056 -0.068 -0.070 -0.070* -0.073* -0.056** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.092) (0.017) (0.191) (0.128) (0.138) (0.090) (0.086) (0.044) 
Private Invt. 0.080** 0.083** 0.066 0.068* 0.046 0.080*** 0.083** 0.066*** 0.068* 0.046 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.101) (0.092) (0.263) (0.009) (0.021) (0.002) (0.062) (0.160) 
Tax revenues  0.081*** 0.060** 0.110*** 0.052 0.040 0.081*** 0.060** 0.110** 0.052 0.040 
 (0.001) (0.032) (0.000) (0.262) (0.472) (0.009) (0.020) (0.030) (0.131) (0.521) 
ITax revenues --- -0.032 --- --- -0.039 --- -0.032 --- --- -0.039* 
  (0.139)   (0.182)  (0.169)   (0.094) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.067 --- 0.041 --- --- 0.067 --- 0.041 
   (0.305)  (0.535)   (0.251)  (0.598) 
GDPg --- --- --- -0.148 -0.179 --- --- --- -0.148* -0.179** 
    (0.262) (0.210)    (0.063) (0.027) 
           
Hausman test 12.57*** 12.232* 13.7*** 16.43*** 14.68** 12.57*** 12.232** 13.70*** 16.43*** 14.68*** 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.008) (0.002) (0.022) (0.000) (0.015) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 4.734 2.660 3.136 2.553 0.362 4.734 2.660 3.136 2.553 0.362 
 (0.449) (0.616) (0.535) (0.635) (0.834) (0.449) (0.616) (0.535) (0.635) (0.834) 
Adjusted R² 0.272 0.276 0.199 0.161 0.112 0.272 0.276 0.199 0.161 0.112 
Fisher  8.576*** 7.208*** 3.596*** 5.516*** 2.969** 8.155*** 4.607*** 6.576*** 5.178*** 5.566*** 
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 Panel B: Restricted modeling  
 Without  HAC Standard Errors With  HAC Standard Errors 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 6* Model 7* Model 8* Model 9* Model 10* 
Gov. Exp.  -0.061** -0.061** -0.069* -0.063** 0.075* -0.061 -0.061 -0.069* -0.063 -0.075** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.068) (0.029) (0.097) (0.179) (0.177) (0.053) (0.177) (0.046) 
Private Invt. 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.064* 0.100*** 0.076* 0.106*** 0.108** 0.064*** 0.100** 0.076*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.056) (0.000) (0.060) (0.007) (0.026) (0.001) (0.013) (0.002) 
Tax revenues  0.101*** 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.111*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.111*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ITax revenues --- -0.002 --- --- -0.014 --- -0.032 --- --- -0.014 
  (0.898)   (0.583)  (0.927)   (0.688) 
Inflation --- --- 0.064 --- 0.092 --- --- 0.064*** --- 0.092* 
   (0.141)  (0.142)   (0.001)  (0.057) 
GDPg --- --- --- 0.026 -0.037 --- --- --- 0.026 0.037 
    (0.677) (0.739)    (0.587) (0.625) 
           
Hausman test 70.77*** 75.52*** 75.97*** 65.34*** 80.73*** 70.77*** 75.52*** 75.97*** 65.34*** 80.73*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 5.270 5.258 3.273 5.244 1.915 5.270 5.258 3.273 5.244 1.915 
 (0.509) (0.385) (0.657) (0.386) (0.590) (0.509) (0.385) (0.657) (0.386) (0.590) 
Adjusted R² 0.295 0.294 0.209 0.287 0.195 0.295 0.294 0.209 0.287 0.195 
Fisher  302.7*** 225.4*** 176.4*** 230.9*** 93.90*** 118.3*** 85.33*** 177.2*** 109.1*** 189.74*** 
           
Instruments  Constant, Total NODA, NODADAC, NODAMD, Grants, (Total NODA)², (NODADAC)², (NODAMD)², (Grants)² 
           
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. P-values in parentheses. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. ITax: 
International Trade taxes.  OIR: Overidentifying restrictions. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. CPI: Corruption 
Perception Index.  
 
 
3.2 Discussion  
 A substantial bulk of development assistance literature has concluded that Africa is 
poor because it is deficient of good institutions: weak courts and contract-enforcements, lack 
of property rights, dictatorships, hostile regulatory environment for private business and high 
corruption and; political instability (Easterly, 2005; Kodila-Tedika, 2012, 2013). With respect 
to this strand, in order to end poverty in Africa, the West needs to promote good institutions in 
the continent. With the growing concern over how aid could promote good institutions in aid-
recipient countries, a great chunk of the literature has focused on how the quality of 
institutions matter in the effectiveness of foreign aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & 
Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005). From this interesting literature 
on aid and institutions, for over five decades the debate on the political economy of foreign 
aid has centered around three main questions. First, do donors allocate more to poor states 
with better institutions? Second, does development assistance induce better or worse 
institutions? Third, how do outsiders engineer a transition from informal institutions towards 
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more formal institutional settings through foreign aid? This note has focused on the second 
strand of the challenges in the literature by extending an ongoing debate on ‘the effect of 
foreign aid on corruption’. Based on the available weight of empirical evidence, we have 
found that foreign aid that is aimed at reducing corruption should be channeled via private 
investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure.  
 It is relevant to provide an in depth explanation on the instrumentality of foreign aid in 
the proposed channels. Firstly, it is not contrary to intuition to establish that corrupt 
politicians and/or government officials would try to channel development assistance funds to 
those expenditures that provide more lucrative opportunities for bribery and rent seeking. This 
interpretation is consistent with the literature sustaining that corrupt officials will choose to 
spend money (especially foreign aid) on goods whose true value is difficult to be identified by 
agents (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Secondly, the negative relationship between tax effort and 
corruption is in accordance with the bulk of studies that has argued that a more legitimate and 
responsive state (with respect to voice & accountability and corruption-control) is an essential 
factor for a more adequate level of tax effort in developing countries (Bird, 2007). 
Accordingly, the requirement by Western agencies for recipient institutions to be more 
accountable to development assistance may lead to increased tax effort on two main counts. 
On a first note, authorities in place may want to demonstrate that they need grants because 
their tax revenues are not enough to finance government projects and hence, prove that 
current tax efforts are not tainted by corrupt practices. On a second note, depending on the 
composition of aid, concessional loans are associated with higher domestic revenue 
mobilization to service the loans (Benedek et al., 2012). Thirdly, it is logical to expect aid 
channeled through private investment to mitigate corruption because, it could be assimilated 
to foreign direct investment that has been documented to reduce corruption in developing 
countries (Larrain & Tavares, 2004). Moreover, private investments have been documented to 
12 
 
be negatively correlated with corruption in comparison to public investments in Africa 
(Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008).  
 Before concluding, it would be interesting to highlight how the findings reconcile the 
debate. Accordingly, the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012, 2013a) debate has 
centered along two main axes. Whereas the former has presented a case for the negative effect 
of aid on corruption in developing countries, the latter has rejected the findings from an 
African standpoint. Our results have integrated an indirect transmission mechanism and 
reconciled the debate by showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative 
depending on the transmission mechanism. Therefore whereas the ‘government’s final 
consumption expenditure’ mechanism is in line with Asongu (2012, 2013a), the ‘tax effort’ 
and private investment channels are consistent with O & S.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on 
‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling 
corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note has extended the debate by 
assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 
1996-2010. Two main findings have been established to unite the two streams of the debate. 
(1) Foreign aid channeled through government’s consumption expenditure increases 
corruption. (2) Development assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort 
decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is targeted towards reducing corruption 
should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government 
expenditure. Our results have integrated an indirect component and reconciled the debate by 
showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission 
channel.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser 
      
Corruption  2.984 1.065 1.000 6.400 462 
Government Expenditure  4.392 12.908 -57.815 90.544 468 
Private Investment  12.979 9.400 -2.437 112.35 658 
Tax Revenue  17.693 10.096 0.1166 61.583 262 
Tax on International Trade  21.036 14.255 0.094 61.907 255 
Inflation  57.556 955.55 -100.00 24411 673 
GDP Growth  4.763 7.293 -31.300 106.28 759 
NODA Total  10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
NODA from DAC Countries  6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704 
NODA from Multilateral Donors  4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704 
Grants  0.069 0.115 0.000 1.477 773 
      
Panel B: Presentation of Countries (53) 
      
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti,  Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & 
Principe,  Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe,  Tanzania, Comoros. 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix  
            
GExp. Priv Ivt Tax 
rev 
IT rev Infl GDPg NODAT DAC MD Grants Cor  
1.000 0.054 0.098 -0.046 -0.139 0.103 0.039 0.038 0.021 0.036 -0.053 GExp. 
 1.000 0.448 0.036 -0.042 0.372 -0.222 -0.181 -0.240 -0.174 0.291 Priv Ivt 
  1.000 0.213 -0.213 -0.040 -0.309 -0.304 -0.277 -0.290 0.496 Tax rev 
   1.000 -0.049 -0.030 0.198 0.142 0.238 0.122 -0.212 IT rev 
    1.000 -0.057 -0.004 0.009 -0.022 0.007 -0.047 Infl 
     1.000 0.053 0.034 0.073 0.069 -0.047 GDPg 
      1.000 0.955 0.900 0.808 -0.229 NODA 
       1.000 0.733 0.780 -0.217 DAC 
        1.000 0.716 -0.217 MD 
         1.000 -0.178 Grants 
          1.000 Cor  
            
GExp: Government Expenditure. Priv Ivt: Private Investment. Tax rev: Tax revenue. IT rev: International Tax revenue. Infl: 
Inflation. GDPg: GDP growth. NODAT: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). DAC: NODA from DAC 
countries. MD: NODA from Multilateral Donors. Cor: Corruption.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Variable Definitions Source(s) 
   
Corruption  Corruption Perception Index  World Bank (WDI) 
   
Development Assistance    1 Total Development assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Development Assistance    2 Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors(% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Development Assistance    3 Development Assistance from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Grants   Grants,  Excluding Technical Cooperation (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Government Expenditure  Government’s Final Consumption Expenditure  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Private Investment   Gross Private Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
   
Taxes 1 Tax revenue (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Taxes 2 Tax revenue on International Trade (% of Revenue) World Bank (WDI)) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %)  World Bank (WDI) 
   
Economic prosperity  GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators. 
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